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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EMINENT DOMAIN - EXTENSION OF FIFTH Al\mND· 
MENT "TAKING" To INCLUDE DESTRUCTION OF LIEN RIGHT BY THE DOCTRINE 
OF IMMUNITY OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY FROM ATIACHMENT- Upon default 
of the contracting shipbuilder, the United States acquired title to certain 
materials in accordance with a contract provision. Petitioners, who had 
previously acquired materialmen's liens on these materials, claimed that 
assertion of the doctrine of immunity of government property from attach-
ment resulted in a "taking" of their liens in violation of the fifth amend-
ment. This was rejected by the Court of Claims.1 On certiorari to the 
United States Supreme Court, held, reversed, three Justices dissenting.2 
Since the builder had title at the time the materials were furnished, the 
property was not a "public work" and thus the liens attached. The right 
to resort to specific property for the satisfaction of a debt is a compensable 
property interest and its destruction constitutes a "taking" within meaning 
of the fifth amendment.3 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960). 
In its first consideration of the fifth amendment "taking" clause,4 the 
Supreme Court in the Legal Tender Cases5 held that "taking" referred 
"only to a direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting 
from the exercise of a lawful power."6 Under the "consequential injuries" 
limitation compensation is not required where the property damage is an 
incidental result of the exercise of an ordinary governmental power7 or 
1 Armstrong v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 259 (Ct. Cl. 1959). The Court reasoned 
that since these boats were being built under contract with the United States, they were 
a "public work" immune from materialmen's liens; therefore the liens never attached and 
no property of petitioners was taken. 
2 Justices Harlan, Frankfurter and Clark. The dissent argued that "the very nature 
of the [governmental immunity] doctrine ..• precludes regarding its interposition as a 
Fifth Amendment 'taking.' " Principal case at 50. 
3 Principal case at 48. In addition to the expansion of the "taking" concept, the 
Court also held that the mere prospect that property will later be owned by the United 
States does not make it a "public work" immune from materialmen's liens and that a 
lien-holder's right to resort to specific property for satisfaction of a debt was a compen-
sable property interest. The latter is an extension of a 1935 decision holding that the 
right to resort to specific land was a compensable property interest. See Louisville Joint 
Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935). 
4 U.S. CoNsr. amend. V: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation.'' 
5 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870). 
6Jd. at 551. 
7 Kauper, Basic Principles of Eminent Domain, 35 Mich. S.B.J., Oct. 1956, p. 10, 18. 
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where remote and incidental damage results from a compensable "taking."8 
The scope of this limitation was, however, restricted by United States v. 
Causby0 where the repeated landing and taking off of war planes with a 
glide path extremely close to private property was held to constitute a 
"taking" of an easement over the land. Arguably, under the Legal Tender 
test this was merely an incidental injury resulting from the lawful exercise 
of the war power. But in Causby the governmental action involved direct 
interference with the use and enjoyment of the property in contrast to the 
regulatory scheme present in the Legal Tender Cases. The traditional tort 
remedy for trespass or nuisance would have been available to Causby but 
for the doctrine of sovereign immunity. It is likely that the Court limited 
the scope of the "consequential injury" limitation in order to give to plain-
tiff some form of relief, for although the federal government had waived its 
immunity regarding constitutional claims, it had not done so regarding 
tort claims.1° Similarly, in the principal case, the petitioners' loss of security 
rights seems to be an incidental result of the exercise of the federal govern-
ment's power to contract. However, since the doctrine of immunity of 
governmental property from attachment prevents the assertion of petition-
ers' security interest in specific property, the principal case, by substituting 
fifth amendment relief for a traditional remedy here unavailable because of 
governmental immunity, presents no substantial departure from the ration-
ale of Causby. 
Another limitation on recovery under the fifth amendment is illustrated 
by Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States11 where the government requi-
sitioned a steel manufacturer's total output thereby preventing performance 
of petitioner's contract for steel. The Court held that a property owner 
is entitled to compensation when his property interest is used by the gov-
ernment for a public purpose but not when the property interest is merely 
destroyed.12 In practice this distinction has become quite tenuous. For 
example, compensation was required for land flooded by governmental 
navigation improvements13 but not for a bridge destroyed by rising water 
resulting from similar improvements.14Although compensation was required 
when the government took over a ship construction contract under which 
s Comment, Consequential Damages and "Just Compensation" in Federal Condemna-
tions, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 349 (1951); Comment, Consequential Damages in Federal Con-
demnation, 35 VA. L. REv. 1059 (1949). 
9 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
10 Provision was made for claims based upon the Constitution by 24 Stat. 505 (1887), 
as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1958). Provision was made for torts claims by 60 Stat. 842 
(1946), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b) (1958). 
11261 U.S. 502 (1923). 
12 Accord, United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952), where the 
Court held that compensation was not required for property destroyed to keep it from 
falling into enemy hands. 
13 United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917). 
14 Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907). 
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performance had commenced but final delivery had not occurred,15 no 
compensation was required in the Omnia case. While the critical language 
of the fifth amendment - "taken for public use" - would not appear to 
compel compensation where there is destruction without present or future 
governmental use, the distinction is less persuasively applied when, as in 
the principal case, the government not only effectively destroys a property 
interest but also takes possession of the property in which the interest existed. 
To deny recovery because the security interest had not been perfected into 
a possessory right would ignore the well-established doctrine that although 
the security interest does not represent the totality of rights norm.ally asso-
ciated with property ownership, a lien is an interest in specific property.16 
In contrast to the principal case, in Omnia the government never used the 
contract rights which constituted the petitioner's only property interest in 
issue.17 Thus even under the Omnia test the governmental action in the 
principal case could reasonably have been considered a "taking" of prop-
erty for public use. Nevertheless, the result in the principal case is reached 
by the majority of the Court under a much broader analysis of the problem. 
Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the majority, discussed the elements of a 
fifth amendment "taking" present in the principal case. He found con-
trolling here the elimination of a compensable property interest which 
existed before the governmental action18 and the destruction of the value 
of liens for a public purpose - action which a private person could not 
have done without subjecting himself to suit.1 9 Further, he negatived 
certain defenses by noting that neither sovereign immunity nor power to 
contract relieves the government of its fifth amendment obligations20 and 
observed that the fifth amendment "was designed to bar Government from 
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."21 While these broad 
considerations have a prima facie validity and appeal, all were present in 
Omnia and implicity rejected when the Court developed the distinction 
between mere destruction and a taking for use.22 Thus, although on its 
facts the principal case does not appear to be a major departure from the 
prior law, the broad language in the opinion, if not questioned in later 
cases, might lead to the demise of the distinction developed in Omnia. 
15 Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S. 106 (1924). 
16 Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (192!1). 
Henry J. Price 
17 However, it may be argued that the principal case is very close to Omnia since 
both involved "executory" interests which were rendered unenforceable by the federal 
government. There seems to be little difference between rendering a contract unenforce-
able by requisitioning the supplier's total output and rendering a materialmen's lien 
unenforceable by taking title to the property in which the lien interest existed. 
18 Principal case at 48. 
191bid. 
20Jd. at 49. 
21Ibid. 
22 Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 508. 
